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ABSTRACT

Regulation and Energy Poverty in the United States

by

Michael C. Jensen, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2017

Major Professor: Dr. William F. Shughart, II.
Department: Economics & Finance

An affordable utility bill is considered to represent six percent of household
income. According to recent research, however, energy costs now represent 20 percent or
more of income for many American families. A discussion of energy poverty largely is
missing from the debate about America’s future, as the call to address climate change by
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, at any cost, influences policymakers strongly. For
families on fixed incomes, rising energy prices mean that the gap between what they can
afford to pay and what they are paying for electricity is widening. Our research evaluates
the regressive effects of regulation by studying how such regulation impacts residential
energy expenditures, and therefore the household energy burden.
(91 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

Regulation and Energy Poverty in the United States
Michael C. Jensen
Energy poverty is a topic often neglected in the discussion about global climate
change. Apocalyptic prophecies about the negative future effects of climate change
ignore the suffering of people around the globe whose lives could be drastically improved
with access to reliable sources of energy. Though energy poverty from a global
perspective is much more serious than energy poverty from a domestic perspective, high
home energy bills are a serious cause for concern for many Americans.
This research examines the relationship between regulation, the prices of
electricity and natural gas, and the household energy burden, which is the ratio of
household energy expenditures to household income. Where the household energy
burden exceeds six percent of household income, households are at the brink of living
with a high household energy burden. High household energy burdens can become a
generational poverty trap, so understanding what contributes to a high household energy
burden may help decision makers determine how to proceed when shaping energy-related
and poverty-related policy.
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INTRODUCTION

On August 3, 2015, President Barack Obama and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency announced the final version of the Clean Power Plan, a regulation
designed to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. This first-of-its-kind
regulation was highly controversial, and the Clean Power Plan quickly became the “most
litigated environmental regulation ever, with 39 separate lawsuits filed against it in the
D.C. Circuit by 157 different petitioners” (Small 2016).
Supporters of the Clean Power Plan argued that the regulation would result in
substantial human health benefits, and that it was a necessary step in combating climate
change. Opponents argued that the regulation would kill jobs, actually do little to prevent
climate change, and that the burden of complying with the regulation would fall most
heavily on low- and middle-income American households.
As I researched and wrote about the Clean Power Plan, I became interested in
understanding how energy and environmental regulation affect American households. In
particular, I began to explore the relationship between regulation and household energy
expenditures, which led me to the topic of energy poverty.

Energy Poverty
Energy poverty is “a lack of [household] access to … electricity and clean
cooking facilities,” where clean cooking facilities are defined as “fuels and stoves that do
not cause air pollution in houses” (International Energy Agency 2017). The International
Energy Agency estimates that 1.1 billion people, approximately fifteen percent of the
world’s population, do not have household access to electricity and that 2.8 billion
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people, approximately forty percent of the world’s population, lack clean cooking
facilities (Ibid. 2017). The agency further estimates that a lack of clean cooking facilities
leads to 3.5 million people dying prematurely every year, due to “household air pollution
resulting from the traditional use of solid fuels, such as fuelwood and charcoal” (Ibid.
2016, 14).
Though my research is not focused on global energy poverty, understanding
global energy poverty is necessary to properly frame energy poverty in the United States.
Owing to high living standards, the discussion of American energy poverty has been
expanded to include more than mere access to electricity and clean cooking facilities.
Instead, the discussion of American energy poverty focuses on the percentage of
household income spent on household energy (electricity and natural gas, primarily).
Thus, it is important to distinguish between energy poverty in the United States, where
energy is accessible though perhaps expensive, and global energy poverty, which is truly
a poverty of energy.
Because energy poverty in the United States is in most cases not truly a poverty of
energy, it is more appropriate to speak in terms of a person or household’s energy burden.
Energy burden is the ratio of energy expenditures to income. Individuals or households
with a large energy-expenditure-to-income ratio have a high energy burden. People with
high energy burdens are generally the people discussed when lobbyists and policymakers
talk about energy poverty in the United States. As I will discuss later, household energy
prices in the United States have been, on average, stable over the past thirty years, so it is
ironic that energy poverty has become an increasing public policy issue at a time when
energy is becoming cheaper.

3
Summary of Findings

The relationship between regulation and household energy burden is not clear.
The empirical evidence is not supportive of my expectation that an increase in regulation
affecting the price of energy would increase both the household energy burden and the
number of households with a high energy burden. In my thesis, I propose several
explanations for this unexpected finding.

4
ENERGY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES

As mentioned in the introduction, energy poverty in the United States is in most
cases not truly a poverty of energy. The number of U.S. households that meet the
International Energy Agency’s definition of living in energy poverty (no electricity and
no clean cooking facility) is small enough that in the United States the term energy
poverty is instead used to describe people who have access to electricity, but who pay
large percentages of their incomes for that access. Thus, describing such households as
being in energy poverty can be misleading. It is more accurate to instead discuss the high
energy burden of low-income households, and I will therefore use “high energy burden”
in place of “energy poverty” for the remainder of this thesis.

Energy Burden

Energy burden is the ratio of household energy expenditures to household income.
At the household level, several types of energy burden exist: residential energy burden,
transportation energy burden, and total energy burden. Residential energy burden is the
ratio of residential energy expenditures to household income, where residential energy
expenditures are the amounts spent to provide energy to a residence, such as for keeping
the lights on, the refrigerator running, and heating or cooling the home. Transportation
energy burden is the ratio of transportation energy expenditures to household income,
where transportation energy expenditures are the cost of using energy to travel to
workplaces or shopping centers, such as paying for gasoline or to charge an electric
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vehicle’s battery. The total energy burden is the sum of residential and transportation
energy burdens.
Each type of energy burden mentioned above can be measured in at least two
ways, using a household energy burden or a group energy burden approach. In this paper,
I am concerned only with the residential energy burden, so I will leave study of the
transportation and total energy burden for future research, but the following discussion on
the household and group approaches to measuring the energy burden applies to all three
types of energy burdens.
The Division of Energy Assistance of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (2016, 90) outlines two ways of computing energy burden, using a household or
group approach, explained as follows:

Household Energy Burden
The household energy burden (sometimes referred to in the energy burden
literature as the individual energy burden) is the ratio of household energy expenditures
to household income. It is “the burden placed on household incomes by the cost of
residential energy” (Ibid. 2016, 89).
Thus, for example, a household with $2,000 in annual residential energy
expenditures and an annual household income of $40,000 would have a household
residential energy burden of five percent.
The household energy burden can be aggregated to find its central tendency for a
given population. Consider a population of four households with energy with energy
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burdens of, respectively, four, five, seven, and eight percent. The mean (and median)
household energy burden for that population would be six percent (Ibid. 2016, p. 90).

Group Energy Burden
Though household-level data provide a more accurate understanding of the range
and central tendency and range of energy burdens, such data may not be available. When
household-level data are not available, but group-aggregated information is, the group
approach to studying the energy burden is appropriate.
The group energy burden, which is the average energy burden for each household
or individual in the group, is the ratio of the group’s total residential energy expenditures
to the group’s total income (Ibid.).
For example, consider a population of four households for which information
about how much each household spends on energy or how much each household earns
each year is not available. The researcher is, however, able to access information
indicating that the combined energy bill of the four households is $4,000 and that total
income for the four households is $100,000. The group energy burden for this population
of houses would then be four percent. (Ibid.).
The group approach to studying the energy burden offers a way around
unavailable household-level data, but the group approach suffers from the problem
inherent to studying averages: it tells us little about what is happening within a
population. Thus, when the group energy burden approach is the only method available
because of data availability issues, critical analysis is handicapped.

7
Low-Income Households and
High Energy Burdens

Again, given an understanding of energy poverty from a global perspective,
broadly categorizing Americans who allocate larger percentages of their household
incomes to heating and cooling as being in energy poverty is an abuse of language. A
more appropriate way to describe such households is to state that they face heavy
residential energy burdens. Doing so appropriately differentiates people who have access
to energy sources, such as electricity and natural gas, from people who do not have
access to such energy sources, and who therefore are truly energy impoverished.
Still, American energy poverty is not merely on the list of #firstworldproblems. A
survey of U.S. households that receive help paying home energy bills through the federal
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), for example, demonstrates
how a large home energy bill, as a percentage of income, exacerbates the problems
associated with a low household income: 24 percent of surveyed LIHEAP recipients
reported going without food for at least one day, 37 percent went without medical or
dental care, and 19 percent had someone in the home who became sick because the home
was too cold (National Energy Assistance Directors’ Association 2011, iii). Though a
high energy bill isn’t the only problem low-income households face, a high energy bill
may mean that, on the margin, people are choosing between eating and keeping the house
warm (Bhattacharya, DeLeire, Haider, and Currie 2003).1

1

This is, of course, only one example of the many tradeoffs low-income
individuals may make when choosing how to allocate their money to meet
their needs. The heart of the question I’m interested in asks how the
choices made by policymakers limits or expands the choices people are
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Furthermore, in a 2007 study on homelessness in Colorado, researchers from the
University of Colorado at Denver stated that the high cost of utilities was one of the most
commonly cited reasons for homelessness (O’Brien, Appelbaum, Velez-Badar, and Buck
2007). Thus, not only do high household energy costs make life difficult for low-income
American households, but high costs can contribute to people losing access to a house,
electricity, and clean cooking facilities—pushing them out of their homes and into energy
poverty.
Additionally, the need to maintain a supply of energy to a household in the face of
mounting utility expenses can result in an intergenerational debt transfer. When parents
are unable to pay the utility debt down, they may choose to open accounts with the utility
company in their child’s name. And when those parents unable to pay the utility bills
transfer debt to their children in order to keep energy coming into the home, they create
“involuntary debt traps for minors and other household members” (Hernandez and Bird
2016).
Government housing policies are intended to “create and maintain opportunities
for low-income families to live in affordable rental housing” (Ibid.). However, these
policies distort the cost of rental housing, and the housing subsidies may draw in tenants
who would otherwise be unable to afford to live on their own. This then creates a
problem of high residential energy burden for such tenants because they mistook the
subsidy as a signal that housing was affordable. On the margin, such housing policies
may increase the number of low-income households living with a high energy burden.

able to make when deciding how to allocate “scarce resources which have
alternative uses” (Sowell 2014).
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The same government housing policies that subsidize housing, and therefore
allow more low-income individuals and households to live separately, create a situation
known as the “split incentive problem” (Ibid.). Almost 80 percent of the nearly 40 million
households eligible for federal heating assistance pay the utility bills for the units they
rent (Ibid.). This means that neither the landlords nor the renters have a vested interest in
improving the energy efficiency of the home—the landlords because they don’t capture
the benefits of energy savings, and the renters because they tend to not live in the unit
long enough to make the investment in energy efficiency pay off (Ibid.). Thus, lowincome households are drawn into housing and residential energy burdens that they
struggle to afford. In effect, such subsidies nudge people into living with a high energy
burden.
There is no universally-recognized percentage of income spent on residential
energy that defines whether or not a household has a high energy burden. Economist
Roger Colton, however, indicates that six percent of household income is a benchmark
for an affordable energy burden (Fisher Sheehan & Colton 2016), and the Applied Public
Policy Research Institute for Study and Evaluation suggests that eleven percent of
household income be the benchmark for households living with a high energy burden
(2007, iv).
Another way to approach the discussion of high energy burden is to discuss what
does not constitute an unreasonable energy burden. In the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services’ LIHEAP Home Energy Notebook: For Fiscal Year 2014, the Division
of Energy Assistance estimated mean and median residential energy burden for four
household categories: all U.S. households, U.S. non-low-income households, U.S. low
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income households, and LIHEAP recipient households (2016, 97-98). As Table 1 shows,
in every region, non-low-income households had a mean burden of between 2% and 4%
and a median burden of between 2% and 3% (Ibid.). Low income households had a mean
burden ranging from 11% to 21% and a median burden of 5% to 11%, LIHEAP recipient
households were similar to the low-income households (Ibid.).

11
Table 1: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services FY 2014 Household Residential
Energy Burden

(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2016, 97-98)

Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)

In order to alleviate the burden of high energy costs for low income households,
every year Congress appropriates funding for the Low-Income Household Energy
Assistance Program (LIHEAP). Funding is then apportioned to the 50 states and the
District of Columbia, 153 Native American tribes, and five U.S. territories (collectively
called the grantees) to “operate home energy assistance programs for low-income
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households” (Perl 2015, Summary). LIHEAP funding primarily is used to help
households pay their heating and cooling bills (Office of Community Services 2016).
Authorized by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Low-Income
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is “a block grant program administered by
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services” (Division of Energy Assistance n.d.,
i). The program’s purpose is “to assist low-income households, particularly those with the
lowest incomes, that pay a high proportion of household income for home energy,
primarily in meeting their immediate home energy needs” (Ibid.).
Federal law requires that states and other LIHEAP grantees use two methods for
determining whether a household is eligible to receive LIHEAP aid: eligibility based on
income and eligibility based on receipt of other benefits (Perl 2015, 4). Eligibility based
on income requires that states and other LIHEAP grantees set eligibility at no more than
“150% of the federal poverty income guidelines or, if greater, 60% of the state median
income,” and must not declare ineligible any household with income “below 110% of the
poverty guidelines” (Ibid.). Eligibility based on receipt of other benefits allows states and
other LIHEAP grantees to qualify “any household of which at least one member is a
recipient of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP,
formerly Food Stamps), or certain needs-tested veterans’ programs” (Ibid.). Furthermore,
42 U.S.C. §8624(b)(3) requires that grantees reach out to low income households with
high energy burdens (U.S. Government Publishing Office).
Although the law requires that LIHEAP funding be used to help low income
households with high energy burdens, LIHEAP is not an entitlement program. Financial
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aid is awarded on a first-come, first-served, basis and the National Energy Assistance
Directors’ Association (NEADA) indicates that about only 20% of LIHEAP-eligible
households receive financial aid before funding runs out (2017). Figure 1 shows for the
years 2000-2011 the number of households eligible for LIHEAP funding and the number
of households that actually received LIHEAP assistance, for the years 2000-2011 (Perl
2015, p. 9).
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Figure 1: LIHEAP Recipients FY 2000-2011

(Perl 2015, p. 9)

Congress grants two types of LIHEAP funding: regular funds (also called block
grant funds) and emergency funds. While emergency funds are awarded “at the discretion
of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services based on emergency
need,” regular funds are allocated by formula (Perl 2015, Summary). The formula used to
allocate funding for LIHEAP is a composite of what are known as the “old” and “new”
formulas (Ibid.).
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When Congress enacted LIHEAP in 1981, the program replaced the Low-Income
Energy Assistance Program (LIEAP) but adopted the same formula used for LIEAP to
determine how funds would be allocated to the states. Under LIEAP, cold-weather states
benefitted over warm-weather states, as the funding primarily was meant to aid in heating
homes, rather than cooling them. This allocation method is known as the old formula.
In 1984, Congress reauthorized LIHEAP and changed the allocation formula to
more equally benefit warm-weather states more equally. Congress also included two
hold-harmless provisions that would prevent LIHEAP funds from being unduly awarded
to warm-weather states at the expense of the funding historically awarded to cold-weather
states (Ibid.). This allocation method is known as the new formula, and the amount of
money allocated for LIHEAP every year determines which formula is used to determine
how LIHEAP funding is allocated across states (Ibid.).2
Although LIHEAP is not the only federal energy assistance program, it comprises
the most significant portion of federal funding for home energy assistance programs.
Figure 2 shows the total funding allocated for home energy assistance programs from FY
1977 through 2017. Figure 2 also shows the significant increase in funding for home
energy assistance programs in 1981 when Congress created LIHEAP. (LIHEAP
Clearinghouse n.d.). Figure 3 shows the total funding allocation for LIHEAP only, from
FY 2007 to 2014 (Perl 2015, p. 33).

2

The new formula was used to allocate funds in FY 1985, FY 1986, FY
2006, and FY 2008 (apparently mistakenly). From FY 2009 to at least FY
2015, Congress has allocated funds using both the old and the new
formulas, dictating that certain amounts be allocated according to the old
formula and certain amounts allocated according to the new formula (Perl
2015, Summary).
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Figure 2: Total Home Energy Assistance Funding FY 1977-2017

(LIHEAP Clearinghouse n.d.)
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Figure 3: Total LIHEAP Funding FY 2007-2014

(Perl 2015, p. 33)

Home Energy Affordability Gap
In 2003, economists from Fisher, Sheehan & Colton (FSC) “introduced a model
that calculated the dollar amount by which ‘actual’ home energy bills exceed ‘affordable’
home energy bills on a county-by-county basis” for the United States (FSC 2016). They
called the gap between actual and affordable home energy bills the Home Energy
Affordability Gap (HEAG). Figure 4 shows HEAG from 2011 to 2016 (FSC 2017).3

3

Owing to a change in data sources and an update to methodology, the
Home Energy Affordability Gap data prior to 2012 is not comparable to
the data in 2012 and later. Fisher, Sheehan & Colton use a calculation for
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Figure 4: Home Energy Affordability Gap 2011-2016 (in billions)

(FSC 2017)

Each year, FSC calculates the household energy burden for each state, plus the
District of Columbia. Table 2 shows Utah’s residential energy burden for years 20122016, for households up to 200% of Federal Poverty Level. 4 The table indicates that the
group energy burden for households between 100% and 200% of Federal Poverty Level
ranges from 4% and 7%. To calculate the Home Energy Affordability Gap, FSC relied on
data from the following sources: U.S. Census, American Community Survey, fuel-

the Gap in 2011 as the base year to compare 2012 and later HEAG
calculations against.
4 FSC use a group energy burden approach.
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specific information from the Energy Information Administration, federal poverty lines,
allocations from the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance program, the U.S.
Department of Energy’s Residential Energy Consumption Survey, weather information
from the National Weather Service’s Climate Prediction Center, and price information
from the Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts.

Table 2: Utah Residential Energy Burden 2012-2016

(FSC 2017)

As mentioned earlier, no uniform definitions for affordable and unaffordable
household energy burdens exist. FSC, however, uses a threshold for an affordable home
energy burden of 6% of household income (FSC 2016), and researchers from the Applied
Public Policy Research Institute for Study and Evaluation (APPRISE) propose 11% of
income as the threshold for a high energy burden (APPRISE 2007). For Utah residents,
during 2012-2016, then, those definitions suggest that households at or below Federal
Poverty Level live with high household energy burdens.
FSC’s work on the Home Energy Affordability Gap, which includes calculating
residential energy burdens, is some of the most extensive work available, and, in the
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domestic energy poverty literature, perhaps the most widely relied upon. That work,
along with the calculations of energy burden produced by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services’ Division of Energy Assistance (addressed in the section on
LIHEAP), are models for further research on residential energy burdens.

Energy Efficiency

Though total household energy expenditures for low income households were less
than for non-low-income households (Division of Energy Assistance 2016, p. 24),
residential energy burden is used to show that low income households pay a higher
proportion of their household incomes on energy. This measure is used by many groups
to advocate for aid in helping low income households pay their energy bills. But
advocating for help paying for energy bills isn’t the only use to which measures of
household energy burden have been put. Energy burden statistics are also used to
advocate for programs that increase household energy efficiency.
In a report on energy burden for the American Council for an Energy Efficient
Economy, Ariel Drehobl and Lauren Ross (2016, 3) reached the unremarkable conclusion
that demographic groups that are associated with low income also have higher energy
burdens than average households. Their contribution to the energy burden discussion,
however, is to indicate that while low-income households have lower energy bills in
absolute terms, they pay relatively more per square foot of housing space than non-lowincome households (Ibid.). Furthermore, Drehobl and Ross (Ibid.) concluded that “for
low-income households and for multifamily low-income households, bringing housing
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stock up to the efficiency of the median household would eliminate 35% of excess energy
burden, reducing energy burden from 7.2% to 5.9%.”
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operates the Weatherization Assistance
Program (WAP), which helps low income households increase their homes’ energy
efficiency. WAP provides services to about 35,000 homes each year, at an average
weatherization cost of $4,695 per household unit (DOE 2017, 1). DOE indicates that the
energy burden for low income households is about 16% of annual income (recall that
APPRISE proposes a threshold of 11% as an indicator of a high energy burden),
compared to a household energy of 3.5% for other households, and that this difference
means that low-income households must often “cut back on healthcare, medicine,
groceries, and childcare to pay their energy bills” (Ibid.).
DOE funds weatherization services, such as “insulation and air sealing, HVAC
systems, lighting, and appliances,” credited with an average annual energy cost savings
of $283 per household (Ibid.). DOE also states that WAP can reduce household heating
costs in cold weather states by an average of 30%, that the program “returns $2.78 in
non-energy benefits for every $1” invested in WAP, and that these benefits lower out-ofpocket medical expenses by an average of $514 per weatherized household (Ibid.).
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ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES

In addition to understanding the role government plays in alleviating the burden
of high energy bills for low-income families, it is important to understand why the need
for alleviating that burden exists in the first place. Consider again the energy burden
ratio: energy burden = energy expenditures / income.
Most research on energy poverty in the United States focuses on discovering to
what degree it exists, what it means for low-income households, and how to lighten the
energy burden of low-income households. That is, the question that most current research
tries to answer is “Given the price of energy and a low household income, how can
government alleviate the problem of a high energy burden?” This question looks at the
inputs—energy prices and household income—and seeks an answer ex post facto that
fixes the identified problem of high energy burdens. Solutions then come in the form of
welfare programs like LIHEAP and WAP.
Of the two components of the energy burden ratio, the most significant is
household income. Household energy expenditures do fluctuate from household to
household, but not so extremely that energy expenditures (the numerator) is the key
determinant of a household having an affordable or a high energy burden. Unsurprisingly,
then, a high energy burden goes hand-in-hand with having a low income, and increasing a
household’s income is the surest way of reducing the household energy burden.
The question of how to increase household income is the central problem of the
high energy burden discussion, and is the same problem discussed since at least Adam
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Smith’s Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776. That is, what conditions give rise to
wealth and prosperity, for individuals and for nations?
The question of how to increase household income, and alleviate the burden of
having a low-household income, is broadly discussed and frequently debated. I leave that
discussion to others, acknowledging that it is the more significant component of
addressing high household energy burdens. In my research, I instead focus on
understanding the admittedly smaller and less significant, and therefore less-discussed
question of the determinants of energy prices. That is, what happens in the market and in
politics that affects how much people pay for household energy? As mentioned earlier,
most research takes the energy prices and household income as given, and then works to
find ways to solve the problem. In this thesis, I’ve attempted to explore the question of
high energy burden by looking at what affects the price of energy. That is, I attempt to
approach the problem of energy burden from the foundation of understanding what
affects the price of energy. Understanding the factors that increase the price of energy
offers another way for policymakers to address the issue of high energy burdens, and my
research is meant to help start, and contribute to, that discussion.

The Story of the American Energy Market
Over the course of America’s history, its inhabitants have moved from relying on
wood as a primary energy source to using coal, petroleum products, nuclear energy, and
natural gas. Recent technological developments have allowed people to harness energy
from sunlight, wind, and the ocean’s tides. Of the energy sources currently available, “the
three major fossil fuels—petroleum, natural gas, and coal, which together provided 87%
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of total U.S. primary energy over the past decade—have dominated the U.S. fuel mix for
well over 100 years … [and] the predominance of these three energy sources is likely to
continue into the future” (EIA 2013).
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), “in all but 14 of the
years from 1949 to 2007, energy consumption increased over the previous year. Total
U.S. energy consumption reached its highest level in 2007” (EIA 2017). The recession in
2009 significantly reduced energy consumption, and “total U.S. energy consumption in
2016 was about 4% less than consumption in 2007” (EIA 2017).
By far, given its abundance, coal has been the largest contributor to electricity
generation in the United States, with natural gas increasing over the previous decades to
overtake coal in 2015 (see Figure 5). As Figures 6 and 7 show, the nominal prices of
electricity and natural gas have risen over time.
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Figure 5: U.S. Electricity Net Generation

(EIA 2017)

Figure 6: U.S. Average Retail Prices of Electricity

(EIA 2017)
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Figure 7: U.S. Average Retail Prices of Natural Gas

(EIA 2017)
Though Figures 6 and 7, downloaded from EIA’s website, indicate that prices
have increased over time, looking at the data another way tells a different story. When
EIA’s data are broken down into state-level data, it appears that high prices in a few
states (Hawaii, in particular) have caused the average cost of electricity and natural gas to
increase rather than there being a general increase in cost across all states. After
analyzing the data at the state-level, and putting the price of energy in constant 2015
dollars, my analysis shows that the prices of electricity and natural gas have either fallen
slightly or stayed about the same over the past few decades (see Figures 8 and 9). This
begs the question, “Why?”
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Figure 8: State Residential Price of Electricity

Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state. The outlier is
Hawaii.
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars.
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017)5.

EIA’s State Energy Data System (SEDS) provides comprehensive state energy
statistics. The database is very large, and I stitched together a smaller data set using the
variables I needed for my research. The dataset I built is available upon request.
5
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Figure 9: State Residential Price of Natural Gas

Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state. The outlier is
Hawaii.
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars.
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017).

What Affects the Price of Energy?

In order to understand the numerator of the energy burden ratio (energy
expenditures), it is necessary to understand the determinants of the price of energy. In the
context of residential energy burden, then, it is necessary to understand what affects the
price of electricity and natural gas, as they “are the most-consumed energy sources in
U.S. homes” (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013).
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the factors affecting
electricity and natural gas prices include: per unit cost of fuel; power plant construction,
maintenance, and operating costs; transmission and distribution costs; weather conditions
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(because extreme temperatures increase demand); type of customer (residential,
commercial, industrial, or transportation); geographic location; federal and state
regulations (such as the prices set by Public Service or Public Utility Commissions); and
variations in the amount of natural gas production, imports and exports, and storage (EIA
2016 and 2016).
In addition to the above-mentioned factors, regulation affecting everything from
the process of extracting and harnessing energy to the system of delivering that energy to
consumers will also affect the retail energy prices. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) acknowledges that causal chain in its regulatory impact analyses of
various Clean Air Act-related regulations. In its “Regulatory Impact Analysis for the
Clean Power Plan Final Rule,” for example, EPA reported the results of its use of the
Integrated Planning Model to project the impact of the Clean Power Plan, a regulation
affecting carbon dioxide emissions from power plants (EPA 2015, 3-1).
EPA predicts that the Clean Power Plan will affect the price of natural gas and
coal, but because those fuel sources are “important inputs to the production of other
goods and services,” this increase in price will also lead to “changes in the quantities
and/or prices of the goods or services produced” elsewhere (Ibid., 5-3). That is,
regulation affects the price of fuel sources needed to generate electricity and other inputs
used to support other goods and services demanded by consumers. Regulation, therefore,
is like the proverbial stone tossed into a pond—it ripples through the whole system and
has anticipated and unanticipated consequences.
Though there is much to study on the topic of the determinants of energy prices,
and of electricity and natural gas in particular, my immediate interest is in EPA’s analysis
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of the impact of its regulation on the economy. I am interested in understanding how
energy and environmental regulations affect the prices of the electricity and natural gas
people use in their homes. Furthermore, I’m interested in extending that understanding to
the effect of higher energy prices on residential energy burdens. If, as EPA claims,
regulation increases the costs of the basic energy inputs of the economy, then
understanding what the resulting higher prices mean for low-income households is an
important element of the discussion of poverty in general and energy burden in particular.
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REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The economic growth experienced since the Industrial Revolution vaulted
millions of people out of poverty and raised their standards of living. But the increase in
quality of life has not been free of consequences. Concern for the pollution generated by
such economic growth has propelled people to pursue solutions through government
action.
Yet the push to regulate the energy sources that have revolutionized the economy
has not been free of consequences either. From a global perspective, seeking to limit
carbon dioxide producing energy sources, like coal, means that millions (if not billions)
of people are being held back from more comfortable lifestyles because they lack access
to cheap and reliable energy. From a U.S. perspective, regulating energy sources like coal
and natural gas, and therefore increasing the price of basic inputs to the economy, raises
the cost of living for all. When this happens, it isn’t the wealthy who bear the heaviest
burden of the regulation, but rather those who lack the financial resources to insulate
them from the shock of higher prices.
A relevant study is by Terry Dinan and Diane Lim Rogers, in the June 2002 issue
of the National Tax Journal. They modeled the distributional effects of a proposed cap on
U.S. carbon-dioxide emissions. In their analysis, they stated that “carbon-intensive
consumption—defined here as expenditures on electricity, natural gas, fuel oil and coal,
and gasoline and oil—makes up larger fractions of the total expenditures of lower-income
households” (210). Thus, a policy limiting carbon emissions may have a regressive
effect, and low-income households would bear the heaviest burden of complying with the
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policy unless the “government sought to offset the regressivity of the policy-induced
price increases by providing lump-sum rebates” (Ibid., 219). As it relates to my research,
this conclusion suggests a positive relationship between more regulation and more energy
poverty, unless actions are taken to moderate the burden on low-income households.
Inasmuch as energy and environmental regulation aims to internalize the external
cost of pollution, regulation is a roundabout way to tax energy production without
actually calling the intervention a tax. Thus, the literature on the effects of a carbon
dioxide tax is relevant to my research.
Andrea Baranzini, Jose Goldemberg, and Stefan Speck, in their 2000 paper
published in Ecological Economics, summarized the results of several studies showing
that “carbon taxes are generally regressive, but less than first expected” (404). They
concluded that “the distributional impacts of carbon tax are quite complicated, since they
depend on at least four factors:” household expenditure patterns, the degree to which the
burden of the tax is passed on from producers to consumers, the distribution of benefits
resulting from improved environmental quality, and how revenues generated from the tax
are used to reduce the regressive impact of the tax (Ibid., 404). Inasmuch as regulation
can be considered a method of taxation, this research indicates that I should expect to see
that regulation is regressive, meaning that more regulation has a positive correlation with
higher energy burdens, but that the relationship may be weaker than I would expect at
first, given the four considerations mentioned.
Gbadebo Oladosu and Adam Rose, in a study published May 2007 in Energy
Economics, examined the distributional impacts of a proposed carbon tax in the
Susquehanna River Basin and concluded that the tax would be mildly progressive, in
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contrast to most of the literature suggesting that a carbon tax is mildly regressive. They
state that their study indicates that, despite the progressivity of the carbon tax, “lower
income groups [will] spend relatively more of their income on Food, Housing, and Health
Services than prior to the imposition of the tax,” (536) and conclude by refraining from
the suggestion that the study’s finding of carbon tax progressivity is generalizable to “all
other regions” (Ibid., 538).
Two working papers, “Regressive Effects of Regulation” by Diana Thomas and
“How Do Federal Regulations Affect Consumer Prices?” by Dustin Chambers and
Courtney Collins, informed my early research of the regressive effects of regulation.
Specifically, Chambers and Collins found that “a 10 percent increase in total regulations
leads to a 0.687 percent increase in consumer prices (Chambers and Collins 2016, 4);
Thomas concluded that “regulation reflects the preferences of high-income households
and effectively redistributes wealth from the poor to the middle class and the rich”
(Thomas 2012, abstract). Together, these papers assert that regulation tends to reflect the
preferences of middle- and higher-income households, but that the burden of regulation
tends to fall disproportionately on lower-income households.
The findings by Thomas, Chambers, and Collins indicate support for the public
choice school of thought: people are people, whether they are making a choice in the
marketplace or in the voting booth. Rather than voting in “the public interest,” selfinterested human beings vote and act to promote their own well-being in the political
environment. Though individuals may not implement policy with the express purpose of
harming lower income groups, their personal preferences result in policies that benefit
themselves at the expense of others. Those groups that can mobilize and exert influence
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on the political system are able to take advantage of groups that are not able to do so, and
low-income households appear to be the ones bearing the brunt of the policy preferences
of wealthier households.
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THE PRICE-REGULATION PUZZLE

As mentioned earlier, the prices of electricity and natural gas general decline or
stay constant over time (see Figures 8 and 9). Data from the Mercatus Center, however,
shows that regulation over the past several decades has grown markedly, and Figures 10
and 11 show the rise in regulation since 1980. Figure 10 shows the growth in regulatory
restrictions overall, and Figure 11 shows the growth in energy and environmental
regulatory restrictions.

Figure 10: Regulatory Restriction Count

(Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017)

36
Figure 11: Energy and Environmental Regulatory Restriction Count

(Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017)
Following the Mercatus Center’s definition, the regulatory restriction count is the
number of words like “shall” and “must” that indicate a requirement to comply. The
creators of the Mercatus Center’s regulation database write that counting the restrictions,
rather than overall word or page counts, is a more accurate indicator of the regulatory
burden “because some regulatory programs can be hundreds of pages long with relatively
few restrictions, while others only have a few paragraphs with a relatively high number
of restrictions” (Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin 2017).
Because I am interested specifically in energy and environmental regulation, not
just overall regulation, I used Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin’s classification of the
regulation data in order to count the number of energy and environmental regulatory
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restrictions since 1980 (as mentioned, shown in Figure 11). The same trend applies as
with regulation in general: a significant increase since 1980.
As Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 indicate, the idea that regulation increases the price of
energy seems to not have been borne out as theory anticipated. Regulation is rising, while
inflation-adjusted energy prices either remain constant or are falling. What explains this
surprising observation?
There is, of course, the tempting correlation-causation answer: contrary to
expectation, regulation reduces energy prices. But the correlation between regulatory
growth and declining or constant energy prices does not indicate causation—at least not
without further exploration.

Questions and Hypotheses

As mentioned earlier, the price of energy is affected by many factors. Because I
am interested in the relationship between regulation and residential energy burden, and
the relationship between energy and environmental regulation and residential energy
burden, in particular, I must break my research question down into smaller components.
In order to explore how regulation affects the residential energy burden, I must ask:
1) How does regulation, and energy and environmental regulation, in particular,
affect the prices of electricity and natural gas?6
2) How does regulation and the prices of electricity and natural gas affect the
household residential energy burden?

6

Though energy sources other than electricity and natural gas are used to provide energy
to households, electricity and natural gas are the two largest sources used in households.
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Given my expectations after reading the literature, and despite my initial finding
that increasing regulation does not seem to have led to higher energy prices, my
directional hypothesis is that an increase in regulation, and an increase in energy and
environmental regulation in particular, raises the prices of electricity and natural gas,
which in turn raise the residential energy burden.
My non-directional hypothesis is than an increase in regulation, and an increase in
energy and environmental regulation in particular, affects the prices of electricity and
natural gas, which in turn affects the residential energy burden.
In order to account for the possibility of no relationship, my null hypothesis is that
no causal relationship exists between an increase in regulation, of any kind, and the prices
of electricity and natural gas. In other words, an increase in regulation has no secondorder effect on the residential energy burden.

Testing the Correlations

As presented earlier, Figure 8 shows the inflation-adjusted price of residential
electricity and Figure 9 shows the inflation-adjusted price of residential natural gas. As
Figures 8 and 9 also show, the prices of electricity and natural gas fluctuated over the
past several decades, but not wildly so. Figure 12 shows the historical residential energy
burden at the state level, and the figure also shows that from 1980 to 1995, the residential
energy burden declined from about 3.5 percent to 2 percent, leveling off thereafter.
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Figure 12: State Residential Energy Burden

Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state.
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars.
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017).

In contrast to the relatively stable historical prices of residential electricity and
natural gas, and the general reduction in the state residential energy burden, Figures 10
and 11 show the steady increase of regulatory restrictions since 1980. As mentioned
earlier, the term “regulatory restrictions” counts words like “must” and “shall” in
regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, which indicate mandatory
constraints on industry and which we can therefore expect to result in some sort of
compliance cost. Figure 10 shows the increase in all regulatory restrictions in the Code of
Federal Regulations and Figure 11 shows the increase in regulatory restrictions that relate
to energy and environmental regulation, using the two-digit North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) adopted by federal agencies when working with
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statistical data as a means of identifying regulations falling into the energy and
environmental regulation category.
Comparing Figures 8 and 9 to Figures 10 and 11 calls into question the validity of
my hypothesis that more regulation, and, in particular, more energy and environmental
regulation, leads to higher electricity and natural gas prices and therefore raises the
household residential energy burden. Table 3 shows the correlations between regulation
and electricity prices, natural gas prices, and state residential energy burdens.

Table 3: Correlation Matrix
2 Digit NAICS: Energy &
Environmental Regulatory
Restrictions

All Regulatory Restrictions

Price of Electricity

-0.02

-0.02

Price of Natural Gas

-0.005

0.05

State Residential Energy
Burden

-0.60

-0.58

The correlations shown in Table 3 indicate a negative and weak relationship
between the prices of electricity and natural gas and the number of regulatory restrictions
(both energy and environmental restrictions and total restrictions), with a positive and
weak relationship between the number of total regulatory restrictions and the price of
natural gas.
Though my hypothesis, based on the literature summarized earlier, indicates that I
should expect to see positive correlations, the relationship shown in Table 3 is the
opposite of what I expected, with the exception of the correlation between all regulatory
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restrictions and the price of natural gas, which is positive, but very weak. Controlling for
other factors, then, is important for illuminating this puzzle.

Modeling Regulation and Energy Prices

Appendix A, which includes Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7, shows the results of my attempt
at an empirical test of my research question. Though I do find, in some instances,
evidence that an increase in regulation does affect the residential energy burden, I can
conclude only that there is no evidence is found that more regulation has a direct and
strong effect on the residential energy burden in either direction.
My first attempt at an empirical analysis of my research question indicates more
work must be done in order to understand what is going on. Despite theory, and
pronouncements from regulators themselves (such as EPA), more regulation does not
have the clear effect on residential energy burden that I expected it to have. In order to
further understand this puzzle, it will be necessary to specify several additional models to
study this puzzle, including supply- and demand-side models explaining the variations in
energy prices over time.
Though I leave further research to others, I suggest such a model be built by
expanding the models I used for my empirical analysis (and which are described in
Appendix A). I used a two-part model, which reflected the two parts of my research
question:
1) How does regulation, and energy and environmental regulation in particular,
affect the prices of electricity and natural gas?
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2) How does regulation and the prices of electricity and natural gas affect the
household residential energy burden?
To answer question one, it will be necessary to run separate regressions on
electricity price and natural gas price, with the price of energy on the left-hand side and
the factors affecting the price of energy, such as regulation, weather, and other economic
factors, on the right-hand side. Example models, using the price of electricity and the
price of natural gas as the left-hand side variables, are as follows:
Electricity Price

= β0
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards
Rule (dummy)7
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy)
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy)
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy)
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures

Specific regulations, such EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards,
could be added to the regression in order to determine whether specific
regulations, rather than regulation in general, have greater and statistically
significant effects on the prices of energy. If individual regulations were
added, it is important to note that they would be double-counted—both as
a regulatory restriction and as a dummy variable for the years the
regulation is in effect.
7
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Rule, Phase 3 (dummy)
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy)
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy)
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or
cooling days)
Natural Gas Price

= β0
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards
Rule (dummy)
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy)
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy)
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy)
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy)
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy)
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy)
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or
cooling days)

The results of these first regressions would then inform the results of the secondstage regression, which will look something like:
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Residential Energy Burden = β0
+ β1 Environmental Regulatory Restrictions
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards
Rule (dummy)
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy)
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy)
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy)
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy)
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy)
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy)
+ β10 State Poverty Rate
+ β11 Price of Residential Electricity (cents/kWh)
+ β12 Price of Residential Natural Gas (dollars/thousand
cubic feet)
As I discuss in Appendix A, one of the problems I ran into is a lack of data at the
household level, meaning that I was not able to get a sample of individual household
energy consumption and income data. Instead, I gathered aggregated household energy
consumption and income data—recall this is the method described in the group approach
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to studying energy burden. Though this method was useful in describing the group energy
burden in each state and for the nation, it had limited value because much of the variation
in energy burden was lost in the state and national averages. Thus, such an approach did
not allow me to see whether the energy burden was or was not increasing on the margin.
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ANALYSIS

As mentioned earlier, a glance at Figures 8 and 9 shows that inflation-adjusted
electricity and natural gas prices have remained fairly constant over time, even as
regulation has been increasing almost exponentially. Furthermore, the correlations and
the results of my first-attempt at an empirical test of my research question do not indicate
support for the idea that regulation increases energy prices or, in turn, affects the
residential energy burden.
Acknowledging that the answer to my research question may simply be that there
is no relationship between regulation and energy prices or residential energy burden, I
expect that if theory is in fact correct, supply- and demand-side factors that explain why
there appears to be no relationship when a relationship may actually exist. I suspect that
the explanation for my findings of no relationship lie in understanding how the demand
for and supply of energy has circumvented or mitigated the effect of increasing
regulation.

Competition-Driven Innovation
Competition spurs innovation. As an example, consider OPEC’s price war on
American hydraulic fracturing. When OPEC agreed to drive down oil prices in an effort
to strangle American fracking, entrepreneurs responded with innovation that made
fracking more cost-effective, allowing American fracking to compete even more strongly
with OPEC. OPEC’s effort to strangle American fracking through a price war backfired.
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Taking the theory that regulation is burdensome and therefore that more
regulation would increase the cost of providing a good or service, competition similar to
the OPEC-American fracking conflict could offset the burden of regulation to the degree
that it appears as though regulation had no effect on costs or prices. Such may be the case
with American residential energy expenditures.
As shown in Figure 13, inflation-adjusted residential energy expenditures have
remained fairly constant since 1980. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
indicates, however, that “energy use for air conditioning has doubled since 1980,” that
households “plug in more appliances and electronics at home than ever before,” and that
“ownership of appliances such as microwaves, dishwashers, and clothes washers and
dryers has increased over the past 30 years” (2013). Thus, despite technological
innovation over the past almost-four decades, the proliferation of energy-using devices
has not resulted in a corresponding increase in energy expenditures.
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Figure 13: State Residential Energy Expenditures, 1980-2014

Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state. The outlier is
Hawaii.
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars.
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017).

It is likely that energy efficiency is increasing as entrepreneurs improve the
devices that have now become a part of daily living. Thus, although the total number of
energy-consuming devices has grown over time, the ability to provide electricity for
those devices and improve those devices to be more energy efficient likely has offset the
otherwise expected increase in energy expenditures. EIA (2012) supports the accuracy of
such reasoning to be accurate, stating that the results of the 2009 Residential Energy
Consumption Survey indicate that “despite increases in the number and the average size
of homes plus increased use of electronics, improvements in efficiency for space heating,
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air conditioning, and major appliances have all led to decreased consumption per
household.”8
It is also possible that energy prices have actually have risen significantly, but that
the price of energy is obscured by how the electricity is paid for. That is, if the price of
energy is subsidized in any manner, the amount households pay for energy, as reflected
on their energy bills, may not reflect how much that energy actually costs. 9

Regulation-Driven Innovation

Few things are as regulated as much as energy is, and yet the prices of energy do
not appear to be as heavily impacted by regulation as theory would predict. To the
contrary, it appears as though more regulation is commensurate with increasing
innovation in the energy market. It may be that regulation, in a manner similar to OPEC’s
intention to strangle American fracking through a price war, is a catalyst for forcing
innovation.10 Such would be the case with the regulatory War on Coal, which may have
helped spur the development of technology that contributed to the now-apparent
substitution of natural gas for coal as the largest source of electricity generation in the
United States.

8

Note that some of the energy efficiency improvements are due to
regulations requiring increased efficiency. See the summary conclusion of
EIA’s February 2015 study, “Drivers of U.S. Household Energy
Consumption, 1980-2009” (2015).
9 Such costs are explored in the research done by Institute of Political
Economy at Utah State University in the Unseen Costs of Electricity
series.
10 Particular thanks to one of my thesis committee members, Chris
Fawson, for this insight.
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This is likely due to the high demand for energy. As technology is increasingly
available to more and more people, and as more and more households obtain energyconsuming devices, the demand for energy increases. It may be that regulation meant to
metaphorically plug a hole in a leaking dam causes innovators to find new ways to get
around the dam, to the effect that technological development swamps the burdensome
effect of regulation.11

11

In the literature on the effects of regulation on the economy, this
proposition may appear heretical, but it is worth considering.
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CONCLUSION

As mentioned earlier, the surprising finding of my research is that an increase in
regulation does not have the direct effect on electricity prices or on residential energy
burden that I expected it to have. This finding does not mean that theory is wrong and
that the relationship does not exist, but rather that further research is needed to determine
whether theory is borne out in reality.
My research resulted in some additional surprising findings. The first indicates
that federal subsidies for low-income housing may distort the housing market so that, on
the margin, families that are unprepared to shoulder the cost of living on their own are
incentivized to do so, and then become trapped in a cycle of poverty because they
struggle to pay for their energy bills and end up living with a high energy burden.
The second additional finding is that, in at least some instances, regulation may
spur innovation. The fairly constant prices of electricity and declining natural gas prices,
despite increasing regulation and an increase in the number of devices using energy,
indicate that something is happening to keep the price of energy stable when the demand
for it is rising. Whether that is a result of competition-driven innovation, a result of
regulation-driven innovation, or a combination of the two and some other factors, is yet
to be determined.
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Appendix A: Sample Models & Results

Modeling Regulation and State Energy Burden
To explore the puzzle of relatively constant energy prices and increasing
regulation, I used the group energy burden approach to create a variable for state
residential energy burdens. This variable does not allow me to explore how regulations
affect the energy burden of households in different income groups, but does allow me to
understand how regulations affect the residential energy burden at the state level
aggregation. As a reminder, state energy burden = state residential energy expenditures /
state aggregated personal income.

The Model
My research question has two parts:
1) How does regulation, and energy and environmental regulation in particular,
affect the prices of electricity and natural gas?
2) Given the answers to my first question, how does regulation affect the state
residential energy burden?
In order to understand the relationship between regulation and the prices of electricity
and natural gas, and the relationship between regulation and the state residential energy
burden, I controlled for additional variables that I believe affect the dependent variables.
In addition to creating two variables for regulation—energy and environmental regulatory
restrictions and all other regulatory restrictions—I added dummy variables indicating if
and when a state instituted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), when the nation was
in recession, and the presence of three EPA regulations: the Mercury and Air Toxics
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Standards rule, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, and phases 1-3 of the Cooling Water Intake
Structures rule.
In part one of this two-stage regression, I estimated the following:
Electricity Price

= β0
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards
Rule (dummy)
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy)
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy)
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy)
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy)
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy)
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy)
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or
cooling days)

Natural Gas Price

= β0
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards
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Rule (dummy)
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy)
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy)
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy)
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy)
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy)
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy)
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or
cooling days)
In step two of this regression analysis, I moved the electricity price and natural
gas price variables to the right-hand side of the equation and used the state residential
energy burden as the dependent variable:
State Residential Energy Burden = β0
+ β1 Environmental Regulatory Restrictions
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air
Toxics Standards Rule (dummy)
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate
Rule (dummy)
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water
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Intake Structures Rule, Phase 1
(dummy)
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water
Intake Structures Rule, Phase 2
(dummy)
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water
Intake Structures Rule, Phase 3
(dummy)
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy)
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession
(dummy)
+ β10 State Poverty Rate
+ β11 Price of Residential Electricity
(cents/kWh)
+ β12 Price of Residential Natural Gas
(dollars/thousand cubic feet)
Description of Variables and Summary Statistics
State Residential Energy Burden
As described earlier, the State Residential Energy Burden is equal to state
residential energy expenditures divided by state aggregated personal income, where the
state residential energy expenditure data are taken from the U.S. Energy Information
Administration’s State Energy Data System (2017) and the state aggregated personal
income data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (n.d.).
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The mean level of residential energy expenditures relative to income is two
percent, with a standard deviation of one percent, and a minimum and maximum energy
burden of one percent and five percent, respectively. Remember that the measure of an
affordable residential energy bill I have chosen to use is six percent of income. This
measure shows that, as a group, residents in each state have affordable energy bills. What
this measure does not reveal, however, is how many households in each state pay more
than an affordable measure of six percent of income. Thus, this variable is helpful in the
energy poverty discussion, but does not provide a complete picture of the residential
energy needs of those who are in energy poverty. See Table 4 for summary statistics.
Regulation
Omar Al-Ubaydli and Patrick McLaughlin, researchers from the Mercatus Center
at George Mason University, developed a database called RegData (Al-Ubaydli and
McLaughlin 2015) in order to improve the “measurement of regulations and the
regulatory process” (Mercatus 2017). RegData measures the federal regulatory burden in
two ways: (1) by word counts, and (2) by the number of explicit restrictions, which count
the number of words in a regulation like “must” and “shall” that indicate a binding
constraint on activity. Because a regulation can be wordy but not be particularly
restrictive, I use the regulatory restriction data from RegData to measure the burden of
regulation over time.
Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin categorize regulation in two ways: (1) by agency,
and (2) by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). NAICS is used
by federal statistical agencies when “classifying business establishments for the purpose
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of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business
economy” (U.S. Census 2017).
RegData uses the North American Industry Classification System to categorize
the industries that a particular regulation is likely to affect. I created two variables for
regulation using RegData: (1) regulatory restrictions relating to NAICS codes 21
(Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction) and 22 (Utilities), and (2) all other
regulatory restrictions. This was the most convenient method of classifying regulation as
either falling into an “energy and environmental regulation” category or an “other
regulation” category.
Because the regulatory restriction data I have is for federal regulation, and which I
have therefore applied equally across each state, the mean and standard deviation
summary statistics are not useful. Since 1980, the minimum number of regulatory
restrictions was 28,327 for energy and environmental regulation and 416,558 for all other
regulations. The maximum number of regulatory restrictions was 93,160 for energy and
environmental regulation and 781,882 for all other regulations. See Table 4 for summary
statistics.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics

Specific Regulations
Even though I created variables to measure the burden of regulation using the
regulatory restrictions count from the Mercatus Center’s RegData, I was interested in
seeing how particular regulations affected the dependent variables. I created dummy
variables for the following regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency:
the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, and phases one
through three of the Cooling Water Intake Structures rule.
In addition to the three regulations issued by EPA, it was important to account for
regulations at the state level. As there is not currently a RegData-like database for

65
regulations at the state level, I created a dummy variable for states that have a renewable
portfolio standard (RPS) and turned the dummy variable on in the year that the RPS was
implemented.
The summary statistics for these variables, presented above in Table 4, are not
particularly useful, other than to note that my data set includes several decades of data
before any of these regulations are implemented. With respect to RPS, over half of the
states have had an RPS at some time, although not all states that previously had an RPS
currently have one. States that have a non-mandatory RPS are not included as having an
RPS.
National Recession
Because of the significance of the Great Recession, it seemed prudent to account
for the effects of a recession on the residential energy burden. Recall that the energy
burden is a ratio of energy expenditures to income. If energy expenditures remain
constant, or fell only slightly, but income drops significantly, then the residential energy
burden will increase significantly. This change in energy burden would, of course, not be
a result of energy and environmental regulations but instead a loss of income. I used data
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (2017).
Though the summary statistics for this variable are presented above in Table 4,
they are not particularly useful. From 1980 to 2014, the United States had four
recessions, the most significant of which was of course the Great Recession which began
in 2008.
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Poverty Rate
Though I used the national recession dummy variable to account for changes in
income during a national recession, it is also important to account for the variation in
economic activity that occurs within each state. For this, I chose to use the state poverty
rate. When this variable is entered on the right-hand side of the equation for which the
state residential energy burden is the dependent variable, it would make sense for this
variable to have a positive and significant relationship with the state residential energy
burden. If energy expenditures don’t change commensurately with a decline in income,
then an increase in the poverty rate would result in an increase in the residential energy
burden, and therefore an increase in the number of people living in energy poverty. I used
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.).
The mean poverty rate in the United States from 1980 to 2014 was 13 percent,
with a standard deviation of four percent. The minimum poverty rate was three percent,
for New Hampshire in 1986, and the maximum poverty rate of 27 percent occurred in
Mississippi during 1988. See Table 4 (above) for summary statistics.
Prices of Electricity and Natural Gas
These two variables are both a dependent and an independent variable. In part one
of my two-stage regression, I use both of these as dependent variables in order to
understand the relationship between regulatory restrictions and the price of electricity and
natural gas. In part two, I use these as independent variables in order to see how the
relationship between regulatory restrictions and the prices of electricity and natural gas
may carry through to the residential energy burden. Electricity price is measured in cents
per kilowatt-hour and the price of natural gas is measured in dollars per thousand cubic
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feet. Data comes from the U.S. Energy Information System’s State Energy Data System
(2017).
As Figures 8 and 9 show, the residential prices of electricity and natural gas have
been fairly constant since 1990, for electricity, and 1980, for natural gas. As Table 4
shows, the mean price of electricity was 12.5 cents/kWh, and the minimum and
maximum prices were 7.03 and 38.46 cents/kWh, respectively. The mean price of natural
gas was $12.66/thousand cubic feet, and the minimum and maximum prices were $4.39
and $58.04/thousand cubic feet, respectively.

Regulation and the Price of Electricity
Table 5 shows the results of the regression on electricity price outlined above.
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Table 5: Electricity Price as the Dependent Variable

The first regression is a pooled OLS model. In order to have consistent estimators
in this model, however, any unobserved state effect must be uncorrelated with the
regression explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2012, 460). If this is not true, the model
will have “bias caused from omitting a time-constant variable” (Ibid.). Wooldridge also
notes, however, that it can be helpful to estimate the model using pooled OLS, fixed
effects, and random effects in order to “determine the nature of the biases caused by
leaving the unobserved effect … entirely in the error term (as does pooled OLS) or
partially in the error term (as does the RE transformation)” (Ibid., 494). Thus, I’ve used
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all three approaches Wooldridge mentions, plus the between effects approach, to analyze
the data.
It is difficult to assert that any unobserved state effect is uncorrelated with the
explanatory regression variables, especially in the case of whether a state has a renewable
portfolio standard. Thus, it seems best to rely on the fixed, between, and random
regression models to understand the effect of regulation on electricity price.
I use the fixed effects model to remove the unobserved state effects and get
insight into the effect of an explanatory variable when that variable changes within a U.S.
state (Gould n.d.). When the unobserved effects are removed, the fixed effects model
uses a pooled OLS approach on “the time variation … within each cross-sectional
observation” (Wooldridge 2012, 485). As long as the explanatory variables are strictly
exogenous, “the fixed effects estimator is unbiased” and the error term “should be
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable across all time periods” (Ibid., 485).
Figure 5 shows the results of using the fixed effects model when electricity price
is the dependent variable. In this model, the explanatory variables that have a significant
relationship to the price of electricity are: energy and environmental regulatory
restrictions (0.01 significance), all other regulatory restrictions (0.001 significance),
EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) rule (0.01 significance), EPA’s Clean
Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) (0.01 significance), phase three of EPA’s Cooling Water
Intake Structures (CWIS) rule (0.01 significance), a state renewable portfolio standard
(RPS) (0.001 significance), and a national recession (0.05 significance).
In each instance that a variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent
confidence level or higher, the relationship is positive. This indicates that, after removing
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the unobserved state effects, as regulation increases in a state, we can expect that the
price of electricity will increase as well. The two-digit North American Industry
Classification System code regulatory restrictions have a significant and positive, but
very small association with an increase in the price of electricity (so small to be almost
zero).
Specific regulations, however, rather than a count of all energy and environmental
regulatory restrictions or all other regulatory restrictions, matter more than a count of
regulatory restrictions. The implementation of MATS is associated with an increase in
the price of electricity of 1.39¢/kWh, the implementation of CAIR with an increase in the
price of electricity of 0.73¢/kWh, the implementation of phase three of CWIS with an
increase in the price of electricity of 1.36¢/kWh, and the implementation of a state RPS
with an increase in the price of electricity of 0.52¢/kWh.
The between estimation allows me to obtain OLS estimators “on the crosssectional equation[s]” (Wooldridge 2012, 485) and provides insight into the effect of an
explanatory variable when that variable changes between states (Gould n.d.). Wooldridge
cautions, however, that though between estimation provides insight into the crosssectional variation, it “ignores important information on how the variables change over
time” and will be biased when the unobserved state effects are correlated with the
explanatory variables (2012, 485). Still, the between effects results shown in Table 5
indicate that states with an RPS have associated electricity prices that are 6.02¢/kWh
higher than states without an RPS. Though the between estimation may be biased, the
direction and magnitude of the result suggest that state energy and environmental policies
are a significant component of electricity price.
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If I assume that the unobserved state effects are “uncorrelated with each
explanatory variable in all time periods,” (Ibid., 492) then I can use the results of the
random effects estimation included in Table 5. Wooldridge notes that random effects
estimation has an advantage over the fixed effects approach because it “assumes that the
unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, whether the explanatory
variables are fixed over time or not” (Ibid., 493).
In the random effects estimation, the energy and environmental regulatory
restrictions variable and the all other regulatory restrictions variable are significant at
0.01 and 0.001, respectively, and are positive but so small as to almost be zero. As with
the fixed effects estimation, it appears that the implementation of specific regulations
matter more than the total regulatory burden: MATS is associated with an increase in the
price of electricity of 1.4¢/kWh, CAIR with an increase of 0.73¢/kWh, phase three of the
Cooling Water Intake Structures rule with an increase of 1.36¢/kWh, and a state RPS
with an increase of 0.56¢/kWh.
The story most consistent with the observations from the regressions in Table 5 is
that an increase in regulations is associated with an increase in the price of electricity, but
that some regulations matter more than others.

Regulation and the Price of Natural Gas
Table 6 shows the results of the regression on natural gas price outlined above.
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Table 6: Natural Gas Price as the Dependent Variable

The analysis of the effect of regulation on the price of electricity generally carry
over to the effect of regulation on the price of natural gas, but with some important
differences. As Table 6 shows, a pooled OLS estimation approach indicates that total
regulatory restrictions, either in the energy and environmental category or the all other
category, don’t have a significant relationship to the price of natural gas.
The implementation of MATS, however, has a significant and negative
relationship to the price of natural gas: -$1.74/thousand cubic feet. This is likely
explained by two factors: (1) MATS and other EPA regulation that made coal more
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expensive facilitated demand for natural gas, and (2) the development of fracking
technology that greatly increased the accessible supply of natural gas.
The fixed and random effects estimations are very similar and so I discuss them
concurrently. Energy and environmental regulatory restrictions are significant at 0.001
and have a very small and negative association with the price of natural gas. This is
likely, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a result of regulation that targeted coal,
and therefore facilitated demand for natural gas, and the exogenous influence of the
increase in natural gas supply due to the fracking boom.
CAIR and phases one through three of the CWIS rule have significant and
positive associations with the price of natural gas, with a corresponding increase in the
price of natural gas from as low as $0.70/thousand cubic feet to as high as $3.44/thousand
cubic feet. Additionally, and in contrast to the regressions using the price of electricity as
the dependent variable, a state RPS is not significantly associated with the price of
natural gas. This likely has to do with the design of an RPS—it is meant to encourage the
development of renewable and alternative energies, and natural gas is not directly
targeted in the regulation and so is unaffected.

Regulation and the State Residential Energy Burden
Table 7 shows the results of the regression on state residential energy burden,
outlined above.
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Table 7: State Residential Energy Burden as the Dependent Variable

Part two of my analysis was to use the state residential energy burden variable as
the dependent variable and move the electricity price and natural gas price variables to
the right-hand side of the equation. I did this to understand, first, how regulations affect
the prices of the electricity and natural gas used for residential energy and, second, how
regulations and the prices of electricity and natural gas affect the energy burden.
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The pooled OLS estimation results in Table 5 indicate that regulatory restrictions
and specific regulations are significantly associated with changes in the state residential
energy burden. Of more interest, however, are the results of the fixed and random effects
estimations.
Both the fixed and random effects estimations indicate a significant (0.001) and
positive relationship between an increase in the number of regulatory restrictions, energy
and environmental and all other, but that, as seen in Tables 5 and 6, the estimate is so
small as to be almost zero. This means that though I find that the direction of my
hypothesis is correct—energy and environmental regulation and all other regulation does
have a positive relationship with the energy burden—the magnitude is very small. I
conclude that regulatory restrictions are associated with an increase in the state residential
energy burden, but that at the group level the increase is so small that it does not appear
to be economically significant.
Though MATS had a significant relationship on the prices of electricity and
natural gas, it does not have a significant relationship with the state residential energy
burden. MATS, therefore, may only have a significant relationship to the state residential
energy burden through the prices of electricity and natural gas.
CAIR has a significant relationship (0.001) with the state residential energy
burden, but its implementation is associated with a small increase in the state residential
energy burden of 0.24 percent.
Where phase three of the CWIS rule had a significant relationship with the prices
of electricity and natural gas, it has no significant relationship to the state residential
energy burden. Rather, phases one and two have significant relationships (0.001 and 0.01,
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respectively) and the implementation of each phase of CWIS is associated with an
increase in the state residential energy burden of less than one percent.
A state RPS and a national recession are associated with similar changes in the state
residential energy burden (0.08 and 0.07 percent, respectively).
Though regulations are associated with an increase in the prices of electricity and
natural gas, only the price of electricity has a significant (0.001) relationship to the state
residential energy burden in both the fixed and random effects estimations. Natural gas is
significant (0.05) in the fixed effects estimation but not the random estimation. Electricity
price is associated with a small, but positive, change in the state residential energy burden
of 0.06 percent and, in the fixed effects model, natural gas price is associated with a
small, almost zero, but positive change in the state residential energy burden.

Modeling Regulation and Group Household Energy Burden
In my empirical analysis, I developed three measures of energy burden: state
energy burden (discussed above), group household energy burden, and group household
energy burden using national income quintiles.
I’ve previously discussed the results of my econometric analysis of regulation,
electricity and natural gas prices, and the state energy burden. The regression estimates
for the group household energy burden and the group household energy burden using
national income quintiles are so similar to the econometric analysis of the state energy
burden that discussing the conclusions here would be unnecessarily repetitive. I will,
however, briefly explain the additional measures of energy burden I developed before
concluding.
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Group Household Energy Burden
As an additional approach to measuring residential energy burden, I used a group
approach, where I assumed that residential energy expenditures are distributed equally
across all households within each state and that each household had an income equal to
the state median income. As is quickly apparent, such assumptions don’t describe the
reality of households living with high energy burdens.
I calculated the group household energy burden as follows: I calculated the
household residential energy burden by setting it equal to household residential energy
expenditures divided by state median income, where household residential energy
expenditures were equal to state residential energy expenditures divided by the number of
households in the state.

Group Household Energy Burden (using National Household Income Quintiles)
Because the group household energy burden I described above, by nature of the
calculation, erases the variability of household energy burden, I used an additional
measure to show the energy burden for households at different incomes levels. Like the
measure I described above, this measure also assumes that residential energy
expenditures are distributed equally across all households within a state, but the
household income is divided into the average household income for each income quintile
(from national quintile data).
Though this measure doesn’t reflect actual individual household energy burden, it
is intuitively a more meaningful measure than the group household energy burden
approach above. Using this measure, the residential energy burden for households at the

78
lowest income quintile is 15-20 percent of household income, while less than one percent
of household income for those in the highest quintile.
Recall that an affordable measure of household energy burden is six percent of
household income and a measure for a high energy burden is eleven percent of household
income. This approach then indicates that households in the lowest income quintile live
with high energy burdens and households in the second lowest income quintile have
burdens that put them above the six percent threshold.
I calculated the group household energy burden, using national income quintiles,
as follows: I calculated the household energy burden for each income quintile by setting
it equal to household residential energy expenditures divided by household income at the
given income quintile, where household residential energy expenditures equals state
residential energy expenditures divided by the number of households in the state.

Conclusion

Though I used three measures of group energy burden in my regression analyses,
each with different strengths and weaknesses, the results were consistent and so I did not
include the results for the second two measures.
Taken together, the regression results shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7 suggest that an
increase in regulation is associated with an increase in the price of electricity, an increase
in regulation is sometimes associated with an increase in the price of natural gas, an
increase in the price of electricity is associated with a small increase in the state
residential energy burden, the price of natural gas does not appear to have an
economically significant association with the state residential energy burden, and that an
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increase in regulation has a small but positive association with an increase in the state
residential energy burden.
Additionally, the regressions indicate that though regulation as a whole is
associated with a very small, almost zero, increase in the state residential energy burden,
some regulations are more burdensome than others. Thus, it may be more helpful to say
that certain energy and environmental regulations are significantly associated with
increases in the energy burden rather than to say that energy and environmental
regulations as a combined whole significantly affect energy burden.
These conclusions are of limited usefulness, however, and their real value is in
indicating that the relationship between regulation, energy prices, and energy burden is
complicated. Further research is needed.
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Appendix B: Further Research

My research resulted in more questions than answers. Because few economists
have studied energy poverty, an opportunity exists for someone, or a handful of people,
to have significant influence in this intersection of poverty, regulatory policy, and energy
and environmental policy. The following is a list of research ideas I thought of while
exploring my research question.

State regulation and household energy burden
Although I controlled for the presence of a state Renewable Portfolio Standard
using a dummy variable that I switched on in the year the RPS was enacted, I did not
explore how state energy and environmental regulations may affect energy burdens. Such
an analysis would be a valuable addition to the study of regulation and energy poverty,
mostly because the state-by-state variation could be captured more adequately. It may be
helpful to begin with case studies of states with many energy and environmental
regulations, such as California, and compare them to states that depend heavily on coal,
such as Wyoming or West Virginia.

Household transportation energy burden
I restricted my analysis of the household energy burden to residential energy expenditures
(electricity and natural gas). Residential energy expenditures are not the only component
of a household’s total energy burden, however, and so studying the energy burden for
households in the transportation sector may be a fruitful avenue for research.

Household total energy burden
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Total household energy burden is the household energy burden in the residential
and transportation sectors. Understanding how households choose to allocate resources to
residential versus transportation energy needs may shed light on how regulations affect
consumer behavior.

Low-Income Housing Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP)
Studying the history of LIHEAP and how and when funds are allocated to the
states may be interesting research, especially from a Public Choice viewpoint. Research
might include identifying the states that tend to receive the most funding and how
logrolling in Congress affects funding amounts and allocations.
Additional research might include studying the efficiency of LIHEAP allocations
and whether the program is operating as originally intended.

Effect of wind and solar energy growth on household energy burdens
Running a regression like I’ve done above, but doing so by state (or utility
system), with yearly data points for total state (or utility) megawatts of wind and solar,
relative to annual average transmission and distribution charges on consumer bills, may
show a strong relationship. 12

12

This suggestion came from Steve Lomax, Director of Environmental
Affairs at Koch Industries, Inc. I was put in contact with him after I spoke
to someone asking for help understanding how regulation affects utilities .
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Energy efficiency
Energy Efficiency for All claims that “low-income households, renters, AfricanAmerican households, and Latino households paid more for utilities per square foot than
the average household, indicating that they reside in less efficient housing” (Drehobl and
Ross 2016, 4). The relationship between energy efficiency and energy poverty may be
worth pursuing.

The masking effect of subsidies
Another area of research that would be helpful, though challenging, is working to
understand how subsidies distort price signals. Understanding the magnitude of subsidies
awarded to the energy sector and how those subsidies, as a hidden cost, disguise the real
cost of any given energy source would be useful in the energy and environmental policy
discussion. This research ties into energy poverty and the regressive effect of regulation
literature if it shows that consumers pay more (through energy bills and taxes) and thus
have less buying power. 13
In addition to the effect of subsidies to the energy sector, another line of research
would pursue the effect of subsidized housing programs on home energy burdens. If, for
example, housing policies that lower the cost of rent are not commensurately
accompanied by policies that subsidize the price of residential energy, then drawing more

13

This idea is akin to research published by the Institute of Political
Economy at Utah State University on the hidden costs of wind-, solar-,
coal-, and natural-gas generated electricity.
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people into housing they would otherwise not be able to afford would lead to an increase
in the number of households living with a high energy burden. 14

14 This

idea was spurred by Hernandez and Bird’s section on the split
incentive problem in their 2016 publication “Energy Burden and the Need
for Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy.”

